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Analysing banks’ intermediation and operational performance 
using the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index: the case of Iran  
 
ABSTRACT 
In order to analyse the impact of policy reforms on the performance of the banking sector in Iran 
we present a decomposition of the Hicks-Moorsteen Total Factor Productivity (TFP). This 
entails a comparison of both the intermediate and operating performances of different types of 
banks in the pre- and post-reform eras. Our results show that under the intermediation approach, 
state-owned banks (public banks) were considerably more efficient than private banks in the 
post-regulation period. In contrast, under the operating approach, private banks were fully 
technically efficient and mix efficient in both pre and post-reform eras. This paper highlights the 
importance of analysing performance from multiple perspectives. The findings reflect public 
banks’ mission to maximise loans to target groups while private banks are motivated more by 
financial profit.  
 
1.  Introduction 
In order to obtain a comprehensive assessment of the performance of any banking system, it is 
crucial to examine the productivity of individual banks considering both the intermediation and 
operating approaches. The former examines banks’ loan making ability while the latter focuses 
on income and revenue generation. However, all previous studies of efficiency and productivity 
changes in the Iranian banking sector have analysed the results of the intermediation approach 
only (Hadian and Hosseini, 2004; Hakimabady et al., 2006; Hasanzadeh, 2007; Dadgar and 
Nemat, 2007; Arjomandi et al. 2012). The intermediation approach analyses how efficiently 
banks transform deposits from savers into loans of varying maturities for borrowers. Given the 
importance of the this role, previous studies have considered the value of loans as a measurable 
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output and the magnitude of deposits along with labour and capital as three major inputs. Using a 
similar classification of input and output variables Arjomandi et al. (2012) found that the 
banking industry’s technical efficiency deteriorated considerably soon after the regulatory 
changes in 2005, and the overall productivity performance also exhibited a similar outcome over 
the period 2007–2008. Arjomandi et al. (2012, p.295) stated that the overall reduction of 
efficiency “was mainly attributable to the performance of private banks which became 
technically inefficient (the worst bank-group) and more scale and mix inefficient over this 
period, particularly in 2008”. Arjomandi et al. (2012, p.295) have also argued that “lower 
technical efficiency of private banks over this period can be attributed to their poor management 
of increasing deposits”.  
However, merely focusing on the intermediation services and excluding the revenue side of 
the banking system is likely to provide an incomplete picture of productivity changes. This is 
particularly relevant when we compare public banks to private banks. It is important to note that 
the private banks’ major goal is to maximise income and profits, whereas the public banks in 
countries like Iran have to follow the government’s regulations and provide services to specific 
groups. Thus, it is of paramount importance to compare and contrast the performance of the 
Iranian private and public banks using the results of productivity and efficiency changes from 
both the intermediating and operating views. On this same issue, Berger and Mester (2003, p.80) 
state that the use of the profit-oriented (operating) approach “may help take into account 
unmeasured changes in the quality of banking services by including higher revenues paid for the 
improved quality, and may help capture the profit maximisation goal by including both the costs 
and revenues”. The operating approach defines banks’ output as total revenue (interest and non-
interest income) and considers interest and non-interest expenses as inputs. 
The major contributions of this study are thus two-fold. First, by comparing and contrasting 
the results of the intermediation approach (Arjomandi et al., 2012) with the new results obtained 
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from the operating approach, we will be able to provide a better assessment of both private and 
public banks in Iran pursuing different goals. Second, this study is the first attempt to use the 
Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index to compare the above two approaches in one study. Almost all 
previous studies have chosen to compare these approaches using the Malmquist TFP index. 
However, in Section 3 we show that the constant returns to scale assumption needed for the 
Malmquist index may be unrealistic when applied to the banking sector and that the use of the 
more flexible Hicks-Moorsteen index is more appropriate.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a short introduction to 
the Iranian banking industry. Section 3 includes an explanation on why we have adopted the 
Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index instead of the popular Malmquist TFP index. It also presents a 
literature review of the previous studies that have considered research on productivity growth 
and the efficiency of Iranian banks. Section 4 concisely discusses the methodology used in the 
study. Section 5 explores the data utilized in the paper. Section 6 discusses our empirical results, 
followed by some concluding remarks in Section 7. 
 
2.  The Iranian banking industry 
Until 1979, Iran’s banking system was dominated by Western banking norms and practices. 
However, following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, all foreign bank representative offices were 
closed. Consistent with Islamic banking practices, an interest-rate free banking law was ratified 
by Iran’s parliament in 1983, which banned the charging of interest on all lending and borrowing 
activities. As the abolition of interest on bank deposits would make saving and term deposits 
unattractive, the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) also established an alternative system whereby 
depositors would receive a return depending on a bank’s investment profitability at the end of a 
financial year. Instead of interest rates, the CBI introduced minimum investment returns (also 
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referred to as “profit rates”) that were applicable to term and saving deposits of varying 
maturities (Valadkhani, 2004).  
An important development in the post-Islamic revolution period was the reintroduction of 
private banks in 2001. Since then, they have played an increasingly important role in the Iranian 
financial system. As reported by the CBI (2008), the ratio of private banks’ deposits to total 
deposits in the banking system increased from 0.7 percent in 2001 to 23.8 percent in 2008, with 
the ratio of private banks’ claims on the private sector increasing from 0.5 percent in 2000 to 
19.9 percent in 2008.  
The banking industry has undergone substantial changes over the last decade caused by 
increased government regulation and technological advances, resulting in extensive 
restructuring. The Iranian government regulatory initiatives launched in 2005 can be regarded as 
the most influential change during this period, requiring all banks to reduce deposit and loan 
profit rates considerably. In addition, the government imposed preferential profit rates and 
conditions. For example, they required public banks to assign higher priority in their lending 
operations to areas such as low cost housing and small and medium enterprises (CBI, 2007a). 
Consequently, public banks increased their loan portfolios to by 30 percent and 29 percent in 
2006 and 2007, respectively.1
                                                          
1 According to CBI (2008), in 2005, 90 percent of the total loans and advances were allocated to the private sector 
and the rest were allocated to the public sector. This proportion increased to 93 and 94 percent in 2006 and 2007, 
respectively. 
 However, the ratio of public banks’ non-performing loans (NPLs) 
to their total loans almost doubled immediately, from approximately 5 percent in 2005, to 10.4 
and 9.7 percent in 2006 and 2007, respectively (CBI 2005; 2007b). As a result, one may argue 
that these changes in the profit rates and NPLs have negatively affected the banks’ management 
success in controlling costs and generating revenues. Therefore, with such a significant 
regulatory upheaval in the banking industry, a study of Iranian banks’ operating performance in 
both pre and post-reform is particularly pertinent and timely. 
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3.  Literature review 
3.1. Why the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index 
To date the Malmquist index has been used as a dominant methodology to examine TFP 
growth within a multiple inputs and outputs framework. This approach has been applied in 
numerous industries and sectors such as agriculture, postal sector, airports, steel industry, as well 
as the financial and banking sector (see , inter alia, Mukherjee et al. 2001; Ma et al., 2002; Sturm 
and Williams 2004; Coelli and Rao 2005; Iturralde and Quirós, 2008; Babalos et al., 2012; Gitto 
and Mancuso, 2012). With respect to the empirical literature specifically relating to banks, Fethi 
and Pasiouras (2010) demonstrate that almost all of the 196 studies analysing banking 
performance via the estimation of TFP growth employed a DEA-type Malmquist index, see for 
example Berg et al. (1992), Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1997), Gilbert and Wilson (1998), 
Wheelock and Wilson (1999), Worthington (1999), Mukherjee et al. (2001), Sathye (2002), Casu 
and Girardone (2004), Casu et al. (2004), Sturm and Williams (2004), Sufian (2006), Chen and 
Lin (2007), Sufian (2008), and Figueira et al. (2009).  
The Malmquist productivity index was initially introduced by Caves et al. (1982) as a 
theoretical index. Färe et al. (1992) later merged Farrell’s (1957) measurement of efficiency with 
the measurement of productivity developed by Caves et al. (1982) to develop a new Malmquist 
index of productivity changes. Färe et al. (1992) demonstrated that the resulting TFP indexes 
could be decomposed into technical and efficiency change components. Färe et al. (1994) 
subsequently decomposed the efficiency change further into pure technical efficiency change and 
change in scale efficiency, a development which ultimately resulted in the Malmquist index 
becoming the most widely popular empirical index of productivity changes. However, the 
constant returns to scale (CRS) technology assumption required for its estimation has received 
mixed responses in the literature. For example, Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1995) and Coelli and 
Rao (2005) are in favour of the CRS assumption and argue that the adoption of non-constant 
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returns to scale in the Malmquist productivity index may lead to the inaccurate measurement of 
TFP gains or losses arising from scale economies. On the other hand, other studies such as Ray 
and Desli (1997) and Wheelock and Wilson (1999) argue that the decomposition of the CRS 
Malmquist index undertaken by Färe et al. (1994) may not be reliable. For instance, Wheelock 
and Wilson (1999) show that when a firm’s location in the production possibility set has not 
changed (from one period to the next), and the change to scale efficiency is purely the result of a 
shift in the VRS estimate of technology, employing a CRS assumption would result in a zero 
technical change estimate. Under these circumstances they argue that the CRS estimate of 
technology is statistically inconsistent. In addition to these general concerns on the CRS 
assumption, many studies have found that such an assumption is not an appropriate choice for 
analysing banks’ performance as they usually face factors such as imperfect competition and 
government regulations (see McAllister and McManus 1993; Mitchell and Onvural 1996; Clark 
1996; Wheelock and Wilson 1997; Wheelock and Wilson 1999). 
O’Donnell (2012a) casts further doubt on the Malmquist productivity index as a TFP index 
and demonstrated that that the popular Malmquist TFP index of Caves et al. (1982) cannot be 
used to reliably measure TFP changes except in special cases. O’Donnell’s argument is in line 
with the finding of a study by Kerstens et al. (2010) demonstrating that the Malmquist index is 
not always a TFP index. Kerstens et al. (2010) and Epure et al. (2011) point out that the distance 
functions constituting the Malmquist TFP index may well be undefined when estimated by 
general technologies2
                                                          
2 For more details on the issue of infeasibility of the distance functions, see Bjurek (1996), Chung et al (1997), 
Epure et al. (2011), and Kenjegalieva and Simper (2011).  
. In contrast, Kerstens et al. (2010), Epure et al. (2011) and O’Donnell 
(2012a) state that the lesser known Hicks–Moorsteen productivity index is well-defined under 
weak conditions on technology (weak assumptions of strong disposability and VRS) and thus 
more reliable than the Malmquist TFP index. For these reasons, following Epure et al. (2011) 
and Arjomandi et al. (2012), this study employs the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index to analyse 
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banks’ performance without making any assumption concerning firm-optimizing behaviour, the 
structure of markets, or returns to scale.3
 
  
3.2. Literature review of Hicks-Moorsteen studies on banking productivity 
As a result of the above shortcomings prevalent in the Malmquist index there has been an 
increasing interest in using Hicks-Moorsteen indices to measuring firms’ productivity in 
different areas in recent years. Some important applications of this index include O’Donnell 
(2010a; 2012a; 2012b) and Hoang (2011) in the agricultural sector, Simões and Marques (2012) 
in the waste sector and Epure et al. (2011), Arjomandi et al. (2012), and Arora and Arora (2012; 
2013) in the context of the banking sector.  
Epure et al. (2011) examined the productivity growth of 73 private and savings banks 
operating in Spain during the period 1998–2006. The authors followed the intermediation 
approach and found that savings banks that expanded outside their original markets achieved 
greater productivity gains. They also found a consistent TFP growth of the Spanish banking 
industry originated at the end of the deregulation of the banking sector. Again using the 
intermediation approach, Arora and Arora (2012) investigated the productivity growth of the 
Indian public banks during the post-liberalisation period 1991–2009. They found a significant 
difference in the productivity growth experienced by the State Bank of India Group and the 
Nationalised Banks with the latter showing higher TFP growth. They argued that the difference 
between the two groups of banks was due to greater technological progress experienced in the 
Nationalised Banks. In another study of the Indian banks, Arora and Arora (2013) used the same 
approach to examine TFP changes of the whole industry in the period 1991–2008. Their findings 
indicate that the TFP of the banking industry has not progressed significantly in this period 
mainly because of the overall technological regress.  
                                                          
3 It should be noted that, similar to the Malmquist productivity index, the Hicks-Moorsteen index can be computed 
without price data. 
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So far in the literature, there has been little research work on the performance of the Iranian 
banking industry. Hadian and Hosseini (2004) investigated the intermediation activities of 10 
Iranian public banks (6 commercial and 4 specialised banks) during the period 1997–1999, and 
found that the specialised banks were considerably more technically efficient than the 
commercial banks. Hasanzadeh (2007) also used the same standard intermediation model as that 
of Hadian and Hosseini (2004) to examine the technical efficiency of all the public and private 
banks in the period 1997–2003. The results of his study were consistent with those of Hadian and 
Hosseini (2004). Hasanzadeh (2007) also found that the private banks were more technical 
efficient than the public banks, and pointed out that the government ownership had a substantial 
negative effect on the public banks’ control of inputs and outputs. As discussed earlier, 
Arjomandi et al. (2012) have undertaken the most recent study of the banks’ efficiency and 
productivity in Iran for the pre and post-regulation period 2003–2008. They categorise the 
authorised deposit taking institutions into three main groups: commercial banks, specialised 
banks and private banks. Their results indicate that the industry’s overall technical efficiency 
rose during the pre-regulation period and dropped just after the implementation of regulatory 
changes in 2006. They showed that, overall, public banks were more technically efficient than 
private banks under the intermediation approach. However, Arjomandi et al. (2012), found that 
in general private banks were more scale and mix efficient than their public counterparts, 
particularly the specialised banks. They stated that as a result of the technological changes and 
government regulations, the overall TFP growth became positive during 2004–2007 but 
extensively negative in 2007–2008. 
Overall, in all previous studies, the profit-maximising role of the Iranian banks has been 
ignored. To fill this important gap in the literature, our study employs the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP 
index to analyse both intermediation and operational performance of the banks during the pre 
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and post-reform eras. In addition, this study provides various components of efficiency changes 
for each individual bank, which can be insightful for bank managers as well as policy makers.  
 
4.  Methodology 
4.1. The Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index 
The following standard definition of TFP is used in this paper: TFPnt = Ynt/Xnt where ntTFP  
indicates the TFP of decision making unit (DMU) n in the period t, ( )nt ntY Y y≡ is an aggregate 
output and ( )nt ntX X x≡  denotes an aggregate input. This definition allows us to express index 
numbers that measure changes in TFP as the ratio of an output quantity index to an input 
quantity index. Such index numbers are referred to as multiplicatively-complete indexes. 
O’Donnell (2010a; 2012a) proved that the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index is consistent with the 
above definition of TFP and, hence, a multiplicatively-complete index 4
1/21 1 1 1 1 1
 , 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t o o I I
HM t t t t t t t t t t t t
o o I I
D x y D x y D x y D x yTFP
D x y D x y D x y D x y
+ + + + + +
+
+ + + + + +
 
=  
 
. In addition, this index is 
the only multiplicatively-complete index that can be computed without requiring price data. The 
Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index is defined as: 
          (1) 
where { }( , ) min 0 : ( , / )T TOD x y x y Pδ δ= > ∈  and { }( , ) max 0 : ( / , )T TID x y x y Pρ ρ= > ∈ are output and input 
distance functions, respectively, and PT denotes the period-T production possibilities set in these 
functions.5
                                                          
4 In general, any TFP index that can be expressed as aggregate outputs and inputs is said to be multiplicatively-
complete; where completeness is an essential requirement for an economically meaningful decomposition of the 
TFP change. 
 We adopt the nonparametric DEA method used by O’Donnell (2010a; 2012a; 2012b) 
and Hoang (2011) to compute these distance functions. DEA does not require any restrictive 
assumptions regarding the functional form and efficiency distribution. It must be noted, however, 
5 This decomposition is referred to as the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index because Diewert (1992) attributed its origins 
to Hicks (1961) and Moorsteen (1961). 
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that DEA has its own limitations and makes no allowance for stochastic noise, and as such one 
should be cautious in interpreting the results. Due to this statistical shortcoming, any possible 
measurement errors in the data could make the estimated efficiency and TFP indexes to some 
extent biased. One possible solution for quantifying the magnitude of measurement errors and 
capturing the resulting statistical noise would be to estimate an econometric method such as 
stochastic frontier analysis. However, the use of such an approach is not possible in this paper as 
there are only 14 observations per year, one for each bank. Notwithstanding these possible 
shortcomings, we perceive that the potential risks associated with using O’Donnell’s method are 
outweighed by the benefits and valuable insights that this advanced technique can provide us.  
  
4.2. The components of TFP change 
Fig. 1 shows mapping of multiple-input and multiple-output production points onto an 
aggregate quantity space. The curve passing through point C denotes a mix-restricted frontier, 
representing the boundary set of all technically feasible aggregate input-output combinations 
which hold the same input and output mix as the DMU operating at point A. DMU A can boost 
its TFP by expanding outputs and achieving point C. Thus, the vertical distance from point A to 
point C shows the measure of output-oriented technical efficiency (OTE), and can be defined as: 
tan
tan
t
t
t
Y aOTE
cY
= =                 (2) 
where tY  is the maximum aggregate output which is technically feasible when using tx  to 
generate a scalar multiple of ty . Hence, TFP of the DMU, and the maximum TFP possible 
(holding the input vector and output mix fixed) are defined as / tanY X at t =  and / tanY X ct t = , 
respectively.  
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Fig. 1. Output-oriented decompositions of TFP efficiency (O’Donnell 2010a, p.535). 
The curve passing through point V is the unrestricted production frontier, which is the 
boundary of the production possibilities set when all mix restrictions are relaxed. Now the DMU 
can expand its aggregate output and move vertically from point C to point V in Fig. 1. In view of 
this, the mix efficiency measure can be defined as the difference between the TFP at a 
technically efficient point on the mix-restricted frontier and the TFP at a point on the unrestricted 
frontier. Hence, the pure output-oriented mix efficiency (OME) is a measure of the change in 
productivity when restrictions on the input and output mix of the DMU are relaxed. It can be 
defined as: 
/ tan .ˆ ˆ tan/
t t t
t
t t t
Y Y X cOME
vY Y X
= = =
               
(3)
 
where t̂Y  is the maximum aggregate output which is feasible when using tx  to produce any given 
output vector.  
Obviously, any increase in technical and mix efficiency implies a rise in the TFP. However, 
when one moves from point A to point V the DMU becomes technically efficient and mix 
efficient, but its TFP is not maximized. In other words, the DMU’s TFP will be maximized only 
by moving to the point E, where a straight line through the origin is tangential to the unrestricted 
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production possibilities frontier. Point E is named as the point of optimum productivity. The 
difference between the TFP at points V and E is defined as the residual scale efficiency measure. 
In sum, residual scale efficiency is a measure of the difference between TFP at a technically and 
mix efficient point and TFP at the point of optimum productivity. The vertical distance from 
point V to point H then represents the measure of residual output-oriented scale efficiency 
(ROSE): 
* * .
ˆ / tan
tan/
t t
t
t t
Y X vROSE
eY X
= =                 (4) 
where *tY  and 
*
tX  are the aggregate output and input quantities at point E. Hence, 
*
tTFP is 
defined as the maximum TFP possible using any technically feasible inputs and outputs, and is 
depicted as * */ tant tY X e= . According to the definitions provided above, we can write the 
following equation for TFP efficiency: 
*
tan tan tan tanTFP efficiency .
tan tan tan tan
t
t
t
TFP a a c vTFPE
TFP e c v e
= = = =                 (5) 
This measure of TFP efficiency measures the proportionate increase in TFP as the DMU moves 
all the way from point A to point E. Fig. 1 shows that there are many pathways from A to E. Thus 
there are several ways to decompose TFP efficiency in Equation (5). Pathway ACVE is used for 
tTFPE  here. 
With regards to the efficiency measures defined above, the following output-oriented 
decomposition can be defined as: 
**
*
t
t t
t t t t
tt
t
Y
TFP XTFPE OTE OME ROSE
YTFP
X
= = = × ×
             (6) 
which can be rewritten as: 
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* ( )t t t t tTFP TFP OTE OME ROSE= × × ×               (7) 
A similar equation can be formulated for any other DMU like m in period s. Then, the index 
number which compares the TFP of DMU n in period t with the TFP of DMU m in period s is 
defined as: 
*
, *
   
nt t nt nt nt
ms nt
ms s ms ms ms
Technical change Overall efficiency change
TFP TFP OTE OME ROSETFP
TFP TFP OTE OME ROSE
   
= = × × ×   
   14424443 144444444444424444444444443
           
(8) 
The first component in the brackets on the right-hand side of Equation (8) measures technical 
change from time period s to t, quantifying the ratio of the maximum TFP possible, using the 
technology feasible in periods t and s respectively. Depending on whether * */t sTFP TFP  is greater 
or less than 1, we can quantify the extent of technical improvement or technical decline, 
respectively. In Fig. 1 * */t sTFP TFP  measures the change in the slope of the line which passes 
through point E. The reminder of Equation (8) measures TFP efficiency change or overall 
efficiency change. This includes technical efficiency change, mix efficiency change and 
(residual) scale efficiency change. We have applied equation (8) in the current study to 
decompose and examine various components of the technical efficiency changes. 
 
5.  Intermediation approach vs. operating approach 
The intermediation approach, first proposed by Sealey and Lindley (1977) focuses on various 
services as banks’ output, with labor, capital, and various funding sources as inputs. This 
approach has been used in many studies such as Berger et al. (1987), Aly et al. (1990), Hancock 
(1991), Bauer et al. (1998), Wheelock and Wilson (1999), Burgess and Wilson (1995), Sathye 
(2001), Neal (2004), Sufian (2007), and Maghyereh and Awartani (2012). Following these 
studies, and consistent with Arjomandi et al. (2012), this paper employs three inputs to produce 
three outputs. The inputs are labor 1( )x , measured by the number of full-time equivalent 
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employees on the payroll at the end of each period; physical capital 2( )x , measured by the book 
value of premises and fixed assets; and purchased-fund input 3( )x , which encompasses all time 
and savings deposits and other borrowed funds (excluding demand deposits). On the output side, 
production is represented by total demand deposits 1( )y ; public sector loans 2( )y , including loans 
and advances for government-owned enterprises; and private (non-public) loans 3( )y , including 
conventional and Islamic loans for privately owned enterprises.  
In comparison, the profit-oriented operating approach proposed by Drake et al. (2006) in the 
context of DEA, views banks as business-decision-making units with the final objective of 
generating maximum revenue from the total cost incurred from running the business. 
Accordingly, it defines banks’ output as total revenue (lending and non-lending), and inputs 
consisting of costs such as borrowing and operating expenses (see e.g., Leightner and Lovell 
1998; Avkiran 1999; Sturm and Williams 2004; Drake et al. 2006; Pasiouras 2008; Kenjegalieva 
and Simper 2011). In our operating approach, we employ three specific inputs (borrowing 
expenses 1( )x , employee expenses 2( )x  and other operating expenses 3( )x ) and two specific 
outputs (lending income 1( )y  and non-lending income 2( )y ).  
All the data utilised in this paper were obtained from Iran’s Central Bank archives (CBI 2005; 
2008). We considered all but three banks operating in the Iranian banking system, as these three 
were not homogeneous in terms of their input and output mixes. We used a balanced panel data 
covering 14 banks over a six-year period (2003–2008). As stated earlier this time period was 
selected to encompass both the pre and post-reform eras, and the coverage of our dataset is 
similar to that of Arjomandi et al. (2012). Due to the data availability and definitional problems, 
an expansion of this sample was not feasible. The full list of our 14 sample banks is shown in 
Table 1. Finally, all estimated indexes were obtained by using the DPIN software programme 
(O’Donnell, 2010b). 
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6.  Empirical results 
As discussed earlier, Arjomandi et al. (2012) have examined the productivity and efficiency 
changes among the Iranian banks using the intermediation approach. However, the use of this 
approach may not necessarily capture the different goals pursued by private and public banks. 
Therefore, in this section we supplement the results of the intermediation approach (Arjomandi 
et al., 2012) with the results of operating approach to gain an in-depth understanding of 
productivity and efficiency changes from different angles. In addition, we provide various 
efficiency measures for individual banks to assist relevant decision makers in their assessment of 
the performance of private and public banking practices. Pure technical efficiency (OTE), scale 
efficiency (OSE) and mix efficiency (OME) for individual banks are presented using both the 
intermediation and operating approaches for commercial, specialised and private banks in three 
selected years (2004, 2006, and 2008) in Table 1.6
Table 1 shows that some of banks have been fully technically efficient, mix efficient as well 
as scale efficient under both approaches in certain years, e.g. National Bank, Bank Refah and 
Bank Eghtesad Novin in 2004, Bank Refah, Parsian Bank and Saman Bank in 2006, and, Parsian 
Bank and Bank of Industry and Mines in 2008. However, no individual bank (or category of 
bank) consistently stood out as the best performer using both approaches and estimates of 
efficiency. 
 The interpretation is as follows. A technical 
efficiency estimate equal to one indicates that the corresponding bank is located on the boundary 
of the production set, and thus is (relatively) efficient. An estimate below unity means that the 
bank is located under the frontier and hence it is technically inefficient. A DMU that has 
technical efficiency equal to 1 but displays scale and mix efficiency less than 1 is still on the 
frontier, but at a relatively unproductive point.  
                                                          
6 Results for the entire period on a yearly basis are available from the authors upon request.  
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Table 1 
Measures of output-oriented efficiency levels for individual banks (2004, 2006, and 2008) 
Financial institutions 
Intermediation approach  
2004 2006 2008 
 OTE    OSE  OME  OTE    OSE  OME  OTE    OSE  OME 
Commercial banks (public)                   
National Bank 1 1 1 1 0.9916 1 1 0.899 1 
Bank Saderat 1 1 1 0.9569 0.8481 0.9185 0.7384 0.7901 0.9744 
Bank Mellat 1 0.9552 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bank Tejarat 1 0.9446 0.9895 1 0.9524 0.9379 0.9615 0.9501 0.9021 
Bank Sepah 0.8924 0.9418 0.9483 1 0.8459 0.9337 0.9093 0.6442 0.9008 
Bank Refah 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
                    
Specialised banks (public)                   
Agricultural Bank 1 0.8808 1 1 0.9213 1 1 0.674 1 
Housing Bank 0.7052 0.7966 0.6313 0.9642 0.7443 0.6419 1 0.6932 0.612 
Bank of Industry and Mines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Export Development Bank  1 1 1 1 0.6746 1 1 0.987 1 
                    
Private banks                   
Parsian Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bank Eghtesad Novin 1 1 1 0.9588 0.9849 0.9322 1 0.9373 0.9059 
Karafarin Bank 0.7454 0.8995 0.8724 1 0.8258 1 1 0.6321 1 
Saman Bank 1 0.8538 1 1 1 1 0.5225 0.904 0.7429 
Financial institutions 
          Operating approach       
2004 2006 2008 
 OTE    OSE  OME  OTE    OSE  OME  OTE    OSE  OME 
Commercial banks (public)                   
National Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bank Saderat 1 0.9382 0.7961 1 0.9957 0.9423 1 0.9459 0.9416 
Bank Mellat 1 0.9503 0.9759 1 0.9702 1 0.9691 0.9998 0.9898 
Bank Tejarat 1 1 0.8452 0.9397 0.9995 0.9841 0.9789 0.9993 0.9974 
Bank Sepah 1 0.9646 0.9552 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bank Refah 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9663 0.9437 0.9146 
                    
Specialised banks (public)                   
Agricultural Bank 1 1 0.9976 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Housing Bank 1 0.9124 1 1 1 0.8855 0.8973 0.9969 0.9878 
Bank of Industry and Mines 0.7239 0.8671 0.6199 1 1 0.952 1 1 1 
Export Development Bank  1 0.8575 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
                    
Private banks                   
Parsian Bank 1 0.9447 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bank Eghtesad Novin 1 1 1 0.9009 0.9795 0.9001 1 0.9859 1 
Karafarin Bank 1 1 1 1 0.889 1 1 0.809 1 
Saman Bank 1 0.928 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
With regards to banks’ output-oriented technical efficiency (OTE), the results vary between 
the alternative approaches. For instance, in 2004 the Bank of Industry and Mines was fully 
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efficient under the intermediation approach, but deemed inefficient under the operating approach 
(OTE = 0.72). Similar results were obtained for the Bank Tejarat in 2006, and Bank Mellat, 
Bank Refah and the Housing Bank in 2008. In other words, these public banks were more 
efficient in terms of providing output in the form of intermediation services (e.g. various loans) 
rather than maximizing their revenue. However, this was not the case for all public banks. Of 
note is that the Bank Saderat was fully technical efficient under the operating approach in all 
years, however, its efficiency declined over time under the intermediation approach. In general, 
commercial banks decreased their technical efficiency in 2008 under both approaches. In 
contrast, private banks largely maintained their technical efficiency levels, particularly in terms 
of maximising revenue under the operating approach. 
In relation to banks’ scale efficiency, Table 1 shows that scale inefficiency is a main source of 
all banks’ overall inefficiency under the intermediation approach, in particular the public banks 
in the post-reform era (e.g. Bank Saderat, Bank Sepah and Housing Bank). This point will be 
analysed more thoroughly in the following tables.  
With regards to the mix efficiency estimates, all of the private banks were fully mix and 
technically efficient under the operating approach in the selected years (with the only exception 
being Bank Eghtesad Novin in 2006). Not surprisingly, this finding suggests that almost all 
private banks enjoyed higher productivity in terms of achieving income-based objectives. 
However, this has not been achievable for public banks, as they are obliged to strictly follow the 
government’s preferential credit policies in certain areas. For example, Table 1 shows that under 
the intermediation approach, the Housing Bank is the most mix inefficient in the three selected 
years, presumably because it is heavily influenced by government policies and priorities in terms 
of providing housing facilities to low-income groups. 
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Table 2 
Measures of output-oriented efficiency for bank categories (2003–2008) 
Financial Institutions Year 
Intermediation approach Operating approach 
OTE OSE OME OTE OSE OME 
        
Commercial banks 2003 0.8905 0.9454 0.9379 0.9896 0.9794 0.9347 
 2004 0.9821 0.9736 0.9896 1.0000 0.9755 0.9287 
 2005 0.9820 0.9775 0.9804 0.9887 0.9852 0.9589 
 2006 0.9928 0.9397 0.9650 0.9900 0.9942 0.9877 
 2007 0.9950 0.6366 0.9532 0.9734 0.9873 0.9886 
 2008 0.9349 0.8806 0.9629 0.9857 0.9815 0.9739 
        
Specialised banks 2003 1.0000 1.0000 0.9648 0.8087 0.7565 0.7511 
 2004 0.9263 0.9194 0.9078 0.9310 0.9093 0.9044 
 2005 0.9548 0.8851 0.9211 0.9572 0.9992 0.9451 
 2006 0.9911 0.8351 0.9105 1.0000 1.0000 0.9594 
 2007 0.9846 0.7420 0.8844 0.9607 0.9926 0.9945 
 2008 1.0000 0.8386 0.9030 0.9743 0.9992 0.9970 
        
Private banks 2003 0.7949 0.9876 0.9502 1.0000 0.9740 0.8592 
 2004 0.9364 0.9383 0.9681 1.0000 0.9682 1.0000 
 2005 1.0000 0.9333 1.0000 1.0000 0.9877 0.9572 
 2006 0.9897 0.9527 0.9831 0.9752 0.9671 0.9750 
 2007 0.8971 0.9336 0.9016 1.0000 0.9816 1.0000 
 2008 0.8806 0.8684 0.9122 1.0000 0.9487 1.0000 
        
Total 2003 0.8951 0.9777 0.9510 0.9328 0.9033 0.8483 
 2004 0.9482 0.9438 0.9552 0.9770 0.9510 0.9444 
 2005 0.9789 0.9319 0.9671 0.9820 0.9907 0.9537 
 2006 0.9912 0.9091 0.9528 0.9884 0.9871 0.9740 
 2007 0.9589 0.7707 0.9130 0.9780 0.9871 0.9944 
 2008 0.9385 0.8625 0.9260 0.9867 0.9765 0.9903 
 
Table 2 provides a summary of estimated pure, scale and mix efficiency levels of aggregate 
groupings of individual banks during the period 2003–2008. The results reveal that under the 
intermediation approach, the average pure technical efficiency (OTE) of the public banks is 
relatively higher in the post-regulation era (2006–2008). However, the OTE for private banks 
shows a large decline over the same period. These changes coincided with major banking 
reforms initiated in 2005. Due to these government initiatives, public banks were obliged to 
provide more direct credit facilities, grant lower profit rates and subsidized-banking services to 
several less-privileged areas. It may be argued that due to this large expansion in public banks’ 
advances to the less-developed regions, public banks became more purely efficient than private 
banks in terms of the provision of loans. On the other hand, the significantly lower pure 
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efficiency of private banks after 2005 can also be attributed to their poor management of 
deposits. Put otherwise, because the profit rates given to deposits by private banks were higher 
than those of public banks, they attracted large deposits, but they initially could not utilize them 
efficiently in investment projects (CBI 2007a).7
In contrast, Table 2 also reveals that under the intermediation approach, public banks on 
average became highly scale and mix inefficient after the 2005 reforms. In general, average scale 
efficiency estimates of the commercial and specialised banks were quite low, varying below 94 
percent and 84 percent respectively, in the post-regulation era. These suboptimal levels of scale 
efficiency and mix efficiency can be attributed to the lack of independence public banks have 
from the government in relation to management of their inputs-outputs. 
 
Under the operating approach, our technical and mix efficiency results are unambiguously in 
contrast to those of Arjomandi et al (2012), thus highlighting the need to analyse performance 
and efficiency from multiple perspectives. Our operating efficiency estimates in Table 2 reveal 
that private banks were fully technically efficient every year during the sample period, with the 
only exception being 2006. The results also indicate that private banks were generally the most 
efficient banks in terms of the allocation of inputs and outputs (mix efficiency). At least two 
reasons are behind the relatively poor performance of the public banks: 1) public banks focus 
more on creating employment opportunities in rural areas and among people with low skills; and 
2) by providing artificially low profit rates, public banks are also obliged to follow the 
government policy objectives of advancing a relatively large quantity of loans to regions 
considered as high priorities. 
                                                          
7 The ratio of private banks’ deposits on total deposits in the banking system increased considerably from 7 percent 
in 2004 to 23.8 percent in 2008. 
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Table 3 
Total factor productivity change and its components (2003–2008) a b 
Financial Institutions Year Intermediation approach 
 ΔTFP   ΔTech  ΔEff  ∆OTE  ∆ROSE  ∆OME 
Commercial banks 2003–2004 0.7656 0.8252 0.9209 1.1259 0.7734 1.0576 
 2004–2005 1.0206 1.4253 0.7133 0.9999 0.7201 0.9908 
 2005–2006 1.1901 1.0605 1.1234 1.0130 1.1266 0.9843 
 2006–2007 1.1417 2.2734 0.5039 1.0023 0.5093 0.9870 
 2007–2008 0.8179 0.8432 0.9765 0.9387 1.0254 1.0146 
        
Specialised banks 2003–2004 0.8762 0.8252 1.0597 0.9263 1.2225 0.9358 
 2004–2005 1.1186 1.4253 0.7820 1.0404 0.7362 1.0209 
 2005–2006 0.9110 1.0605 0.8553 1.0443 0.8319 0.9846 
 2006–2007 1.8700 2.2734 0.8104 0.9934 0.8464 0.9638 
 2007–2008 0.9682 0.8432 1.1448 1.0162 1.0971 1.0269 
        
Private banks 2003–2004 0.9065 0.8252 1.1298 1.2447 0.8877 1.0226 
 2004–2005 1.0733 1.4253 0.7830 1.0854 0.6959 1.0366 
 2005–2006 1.1838 1.0605 1.1107 0.9897 1.1417 0.9831 
 2006–2007 0.9530 2.2734 0.4290 0.9078 0.5147 0.9182 
 2007–2008 0.9633 0.8432 1.1437 0.9720 1.1582 1.0159 
        
Total 2003–2004 0.8494 0.8252 1.0619 1.0989 0.9612 1.0053 
 2004–2005 1.0708 1.4253 0.7595 1.0419 0.7174 1.0161 
 2005–2006 1.0950 1.0605 1.0327 1.0157 1.0334 0.9840 
 2006–2007 1.3215 2.2734 0.5771 0.9678 0.6235 0.9563 
 2007–2008 0.9164 0.8432 1.0873 0.9756 1.0935 1.0191 
Financial Institutions Year 
Operating approach 
 ΔTFP   ΔTech  ΔEff  ∆OTE  ∆ROSE  ∆OME 
Commercial banks 2003–2004 0.8291 0.6976 1.1885 1.0108 1.1758 1.0157 
 2004–2005 1.0265 1.0097 1.0167 0.9887 0.9963 1.0336 
 2005–2006 1.0311 1.0341 0.9971 1.0013 0.9654 1.0383 
 2006–2007 1.0448 0.9995 1.0453 0.9832 1.0613 1.0013 
 2007–2008 0.9874 0.9888 0.9986 1.0139 1.0002 0.9859 
        
Specialised banks 2003–2004 1.1908 0.6976 1.7071 1.5203 1.0056 1.2140 
 2004–2005 1.2389 1.0097 1.2270 1.0363 1.1355 1.0653 
 2005–2006 0.9750 1.0341 0.9429 1.0516 0.8798 1.0264 
 2006–2007 1.0459 0.9995 1.0464 0.9607 1.0519 1.0388 
 2007–2008 0.7907 0.9888 0.7996 1.0162 0.7822 1.0025 
        
Private banks 2003–2004 0.9373 0.6976 1.3435 1.0000 1.1357 1.1979 
 2004–2005 1.0262 1.0097 1.0163 1.0000 1.0598 0.9572 
 2005–2006 1.0661 1.0341 1.0309 0.9752 1.0342 1.0191 
 2006–2007 1.6033 0.9995 1.6041 1.0275 1.5254 1.0278 
 2007–2008 0.8619 0.9888 0.8717 1.0000 0.8717 1.0000 
        
Total 2003–2004 0.9857 0.6976 1.4130 1.1770 1.1057 1.1426 
 2004–2005 1.0972 1.0097 1.0867 1.0083 1.0639 1.0187 
 2005–2006 1.0241 1.0341 0.9903 1.0094 0.9598 1.0279 
 2006–2007 1.2313 0.9995 1.2319 0.9905 1.2129 1.0226 
 2007–2008 0.8800 0.9888 0.8900 1.0100 0.8847 0.9961 
a ΔTFP = ΔTech × ΔEff and ΔEff  = ΔOTE × ΔROSE × ΔOME.   
b Results for individual banks are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 3 shows the decomposition to changes in total factor productivity (∆TFP) and its 
components, technical changes (∆Tech) and efficiency changes (∆Eff). In addition, we also 
report the three components of the efficiency changes: 1) changes in output-oriented pure 
technical efficiency (∆OTE); 2) the residual scale efficiency (∆ROSE); and 3) mix efficiency 
(∆OME). Estimated values that are greater than unity indicate an improvement in the 
corresponding measures, with values less than unity indicating the opposite. Consistent with our 
theoretical expectations, results show that technical changes (∆Tech) are the same for each bank  
(and bank grouping) in each year. Thus, ∆Tech only captures the effect of technological changes 
as well as the effects of government regulations and central bank policies.  
In general, Table 3 shows that the banking industry experienced improvements in terms of 
∆TFP in period 2004–2007 under both approaches. The extensive decline of ∆TFP in 2007–2008 
was quite noticeable, because it was due to negative TFP changes of all groups experienced, 
especially under the operating approach. A general comparison of various indexes presented in 
Table 3 reveals that under the intermediation approach the main contributor of ∆TFP in the 
industry were ∆ROSE as well as technical changes (∆ Tech). Under the operating approach, 
changes in scale efficiency (∆ROSE) solely constituted the significant component of changes in 
total factor productivity changes (∆TFP).  These findings further support that scale inefficiency is 
a significant reason behind TFP shortfalls in the industry. For instance, in 2006–2007 under the 
intermediation approach, commercial banks, specialised banks and private banks experienced an 
extensive technology advance of 127 percent (∆Tech = 2.27), however, a considerable 
deterioration of scale efficiency negated the significant positive changes in ∆Tech and thus 
limited the extent of TFP growth over this period. Hence, TFP changes for commercial banks, 
specialised banks and private banks showed net changes of 14 percent (commercial banks), 87 
percent (specialised banks) and -5 percent (private banks). This result, under the intermediation 
approach, may not necessarily be undesirable for private banks, because private banks do not 
22 
 
have to allocate and manage their funds according to government priorities. Besides, under the 
operating approach, private banks showed a 60 percent positive change in TFP in the same 
period. 
By looking at the upper section of Table 3 in 2004–2005, 2005–2006 and 2006–2007, the 
industry’s estimates of ∆Tech were greater than unity, suggesting that an overall technological 
progress in the industry is apparent. However, from a profit-oriented perspective (the lower part 
of Table 3) the estimates of ∆Tech were relatively smaller in 2004–2005 and 2005–2006, and 
even negative in 2006–2007. One possible explanation for these changes is based on the 
technological advances in the banking industry which commenced in 2004, such as the 
ubiquitous use of automated teller machines (ATM), credit cards, debit cards and online-
branches, as well as the increased pressure on commercial banks to expand credit facilities in 
2006. One may argue that these changes led to an expansion of the intermediation services and 
operating costs simultaneously. In 2007–2008, the industry experienced a large fall in technical 
change (∆Tech) under both approaches, and this was probably due to a substantial rise in the 
public banks’ NPLs.  
 
7.   Conclusions 
In the present study we analysed both intermediation and operational performance of Iranian 
banks by means of a DEA-based decomposition of the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index. We 
estimated various efficiency measures and components of productivity changes of the banking 
industry over the period 2003–2008 using the operating (profit-oriented) approach, and 
compared our findings with those of Arjomandi et al. (2012), which were based solely on the 
intermediation approach.  
Firstly, comparing public and private banks, it is shown that public banks’ pure technical 
efficiency tended to be higher than that of private banks after the imposition of regulatory 
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reforms in 2005 using the intermediation approach. This is likely because: 1) public banks were 
mandated by government regulations to increase loans to various groups, defined in this 
approach as output, and were therefore more likely to be measured as relatively efficient; 2) 
private banks, could not manage their inputs (deposits) efficiently which increased markedly due 
to the profit rate differentials between public and private banks. However, under the profit-
oriented operating approach, private banks were found to be relatively highly technically and 
mix efficient during the entire sample period. This is a major contribution to the literature from 
this paper as it highlights the need to analyse banks from both a service and revenue performance 
perspective. Private banks in Iran can independently pursue revenue maximization in their 
allocation of resources. However, it appears that the achievement of regulatory goals for public 
banks to increase lending, which increased their efficiency under the intermediation approach, 
was to the detriment of their performance under this revenue based approach.   
We did not find any individual bank as the best performer using both approaches and 
estimates of efficiency, again suggesting that it is difficult to achieve efficiency in the provision 
of services and also be relatively profitable within the new regulatory framework. In general, our 
findings indicate that, irrespective of which approach is considered, the industry experienced 
some improvements of TFP in 2004–2007 and a significant TFP deterioration in 2007–2008. 
Scale inefficiency is one of the most pressing reasons for the industry’s overall inefficiency 
during the post-regulation period (under both approaches). We may attribute this to the lack of 
financial institution independence and the regulatory interventions that adversely affected the 
way inputs and outputs were managed in the banking system. However, since the market is non-
competitive and the public banks must follow government policies, the poor scale efficiency 
results may not be solely interpreted as inefficiency and performance mismanagement of 
individual public banks. Under current regulatory circumstances, they have no choice other than 
implementing the normative policies imposed by the government and the Central Bank in the 
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interests of equity and fairness. If revenue maximizing was to be of paramount importance, we 
may conclude that the independence of the central bank and limited government regulatory 
power in the banking industry could boost the efficiency and productivity of the banking system.   
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